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Abstract	Is	free	trade	dead?	In	January	2017,	President	Trump	withdrew	the	United	States	from	the	controversial	Trans-Pacific	Partnership	free	trade	agreement	(TPP).	This	paper	examines	some	of	the	anthropological	implications	of	what	emerged	out	of	the	“death”	of	the	TPP.	It	analyses	what	this	reveals	about	the	changing	contours	of	the	neoliberal	state,	business-government	relations	and	the	subjectivity	of	corporate	leaders.	More	broadly,	it	seeks	to	explain	the	tenacity	of	free	trade	and	what	is	at	stake	in	pursuing	free	trade	agreements	such	as	the	TPP.	Drawing	on	fieldwork	among	state	and	business	elites	in	New	Zealand,	the	paper	suggests	that	rather	than	rethink	its	policy	direction,	the	state	deployed	discursive	strategies	and	elicited	the	help	of	business	to	reposition	free	trade	as	the	solution,	not	the	cause	that	eventually	“killed”	the	TPP.	Thus,	rather	than	undermine	neoliberalism,	the	demise	of	the	TPP	opened	the	possibility	of	its	advancement.			
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Introduction	With	a	stroke	of	a	pen	on	23	January	2017,	President	Trump	pulled	the	United	States	out	of	the	disputed	Trans-Pacific	Partnership	free	trade	agreement	(TPP)1,	exclaiming,	“A	great	thing	for	the	American	Worker	we	just	did.”2	State	officials,	politicians	and	corporate	elites,	key	proponents	of	the	TPP,	cited	Trump’s	action	as	short-sighted	and	devastating	for	the	economic	growth	and	pacification	of	the	Asia	Pacific	region.3	The	“death”	of	the	TPP	was	lamented	as	untimely.	Its	critics,	on	the	other	hand,	celebrated	this	as	a	victory	of	“the	People’s	Movement,	not	Trump”	and	as	“one	of	the	many	signs	that	this	limb	of	the	neoliberal	paradigm	is	in	crisis.”4	Taking	the	TPP’s	apparent	demise	as	a	starting	point,	this	paper	investigates	what	emerged	from	Trump’s	withdrawal.	But	whereas	most	commentary	has	centred	on	how	to	reform	the	agreement,5	I	instead	attempt	to	uncover	what	kinds	of	discursive	work	Trump’s	decision	ushered	in.		 	As	I	intend	to	demonstrate	in	a	case	centred	on	New	Zealand,	in	response	to	mounting	opposition	against	its	trade	policy	approach,	the	government	repositioned	free	trade	as	the	solution	to	criticism,	not	the	cause.	In	doing	so,	the	state	momentarily	rescued	free	trade	and	the	highly	controversial	TPP	from	the	threat	of	deeper	attacks	while	entrenching	the	prevailing	orthodox	view	of	free	trade	agreements	(FTAs)	as	unquestionably	rational	and	incontestable.	To	accomplish	this,	the	government	actively	solicited	the	help	of	corporate	leaders	and	business	to	defend	and	“perform”	the	policy	(Hoffman	2007;	Ong	2006).	The	government,	in	turn,	retasked	itself	as	the	facilitator,	the	benevolent	supporter	of	this	endeavour,	while	business	became	“doubly	responsibilized”,	“morally	burdened	agents”,	obliged	to	promote	FTAs	and	grow	the	economy	on	behalf	of	other	citizens	(Brown	2015:134).		Opening	an	inquiry	into	why	free	trade	remains	“doxa”	(Bourdieu																																																									1	In	early	2018	the	TPP	was	renamed	the	Comprehensive	and	Progressive	Agreement	for	the	Trans-Pacific	Partnership	(CPTPP),	it	was	official	signed	by	the	original	TPP	parties	(excluding	the	US)	on	March	8,	2018.	In	this	article	I	will	use	the	TPP	because	my	analysis	focuses	on	the	time	period	before	the	name	change.		2	P.	Baker.	“Trump	Abandons	Trans-Pacific	Partnership,	Obama’s	Signature	Trade	Deal.”	New	York	Times,	23	January	2017,	https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-nafta.html	3	For	example,	R.	Blackwell	and	T.	Rappleye.	“Trump’s	Five	Mistaken	Reasons	for	Withdrawing	from	the	Trans-Pacific	Partnership.”	Foreign	Policy,	June	22,	2017,	http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/22/trumps-five-mistaken-reasons-for-withdrawing-from-the-trans-pacific-partnership-china-trade-economics/		4	J.	Kelsey	“Trade	Deal	Dead	and	Major	Rethink	Needed.”	NZ	Herald,	17	June	2017,	http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11749471	5	For	example,	J.	Schott.	“TPP	Could	Go	Forward	without	the	United	States.”	PIIE	
Blog	(blog)	15	November	2016	https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/tpp-could-go-forward-without-united-states			
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and	Eagleton	1992)	despite	pronounced	protests	requires	us	to	consider	several	related	factors.	Most	obviously,	we	must	critically	question	the	modalities	through	which	neoliberal	political	reason	continues	to	underpin	trade	policy.	FTAs	are	the	prized	centrepiece	of	a	neoliberal	trade	agenda,	and	so	our	analysis	of	free	trade	must	include	the	cultural	nature	of	FTAs.	In	order	to	explore	what	emerged	from	the	TPP’s	ostensible	moment	of	failure	(Lea	2008;	Miyazaki	and	Riles	2005;	Riles	2004),	I	am	guided	by	two	bodies	of	interrelated	literature.	The	first	is	the	work	from	the	anthropology	of	policy	(Shore	and	Wright	1997,	2011),	and	the	second	is	Foucauldian	discussions	of	neoliberalism	(Brown	2015;	Ong	2006;	Rose	1999).		I	contribute	to	these	studies	and	the	anthropology	of	business	in	three	main	ways.	Firstly,	I	examine	the	rarely	considered	subject	of	free	trade	from	the	perspective	of	elites	(Shore	and	Nugent	2002)	engaged	or	implicated	in	the	making	of	trade	policy	as	opposed	to	“local”	people	who	are	affected	by	free	trade	(Gledhill	1995,	Gutmann	1998,	Hewamanne	2008,	Pearson	2013,	Slocum	2006).	This	approach	involves	“studying	up”	(Nader	1974)	in	order	to	understand	how	power	is	produced	through	trade	policy.	Secondly	my	focus	on	free	trade	complements	the	existing	literature	on	corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR)	(e.g.,	Besky	2016;	Dolan	and	Rajak	2016;	Fisher	2013,	Lyon	2010,	Moberg	2016;	Smith	and	Helfgott	2010;	Welker	2009)	by	inquiring	into	how	FTAs	are	widening	their	scope	to	include	sustainability	and	development	concerns.	Thirdly,	I	draw	attention	to	the	work	of	business	elites	in	policymaking;	a	group	often	ignored	in	anthropology	except	for	a	few	studies	(Wedel	2004,	2009).	By	focusing	on	the	policy	work	of	business	I	also	wish	to	highlight	how	the	relationship	between	governments,	state	actors	and	business	is	historically	specific	and	nuanced;	although	neoliberalism	is	a	well-established	mode	of	governance	in	New	Zealand,	it	is	the	state	not	business	which	plays	the	dominant	role	in	maintaining	the	status	quo.	An	outcome	of	this	is	that	FTAs	are	top-down	initiatives,	produced	by	powerful	government	agencies	with	business	often	lagging	behind	in	both	understanding	and	ability	to	influence	negotiations.	This	is	despite	the	observation	that	the	rules	and	regulations	made	during	trade	negotiations	significantly	affect	the	internal	workings	of	business.		This	case	study	is	based	on	over	nine	years	of	fieldwork	from	2008	to	the	present.	During	this	time,	I	have	engaged	in	full-time	and	part-time	forms	of	“non-local	ethnography”	(Feldman	2011:	45)	on	a	loose	network	of	pro-free	trade	New	Zealand	state	and	corporate	elites.	As	well	as	carrying	out	participant	observation	in	often	transient	settings,	this	has	also	involved	gathering	a	wide	variety	of	data	from	many	sources:	political	speeches,	policy	statements,	economic	analyses,	public	diplomacy	brochures,	think	tank	reports,	news	feeds,	blogs,	legislation	and	FTA	negotiation	texts.	These	“bits	and	pieces	of	policymaking”	(Wright	and	Reinhold	2011:27)	have	at	times	been	complemented	by	in-
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depth	interviews.	The	foundation	of	my	fieldwork	has	been,	and	remains,	participant	observation.	This	has	mostly	comprised	engaging	with	business	leaders	at	diplomatic	or	business	functions,	fora,	dinners	and	informal	gatherings	in	hotels,	bars	and	cafes.	This	approach	to	fieldwork	is	considered	the	most	useful	given	that	policy	is	produced	neither	at	one	site	nor	by	one	set	of	authors	(Feldman	2005;	Shore	and	Wright	2011).	Although	the	account	below	centres	on	excerpts	from	speeches,	blogs	and	official	documents,	my	experience	informs	my	insights	(Hastrup	2005).	However,	I	do	not	explicitly	draw	on	these	in	this	paper.	Rather,	my	analysis	centres	on	the	delivery,	form	and	implications	of	elite	discourse.	New	Zealand’s	self-designated	status	as	a	“firm	supporter”	and	“champion”	for	free	trade”6	and	its	role	as	founding	member	and	official	depository7	of	the	TPP	makes	it	an	ideal	entry	point	for	analysing	the	tenacity	of	free	trade.	During	the	heated	debates	on	the	TPP,	New	Zealand	became	a	nodal	point	of	action	both	for	and	against	the	deal.	Protestors	and	proponents	alike	were	connected	to	separate	networks	of	activism	(Keck	and	Sikkink	2014)	that	spanned	across	the	TPP	countries.	Although	New	Zealand	provides	the	ethnographic	material,	however,	this	paper	is	not	about	the	idiosyncrasies	of	New	Zealand’s	“experiment”	with	neoliberalism	(Kelsey	1995).	Neither	does	it	offer	alternative	approaches	to	conducting	trade.8	Free	trade	discourse	circulates	beyond	the	boundaries	of	New	Zealand	and	is	strategically	used	at	different	times	by	various	interest	groups.	My	intention	is,	therefore,	to	not	only	detail	New	Zealand’s	response	to	a	“mobile	set	of	practices”	(Ong	2007:4)	but	to	also	open	our	understanding	beyond	the	purely	economic	to	consider	the	wide-ranging	repercussions	of	trade	policies	and	discourses.		Thus,	I	leave	discussions	about	the	costs	and	benefits	of	trade	to	others	but	do	take	note	of	this	work	(Kelsey	2008,	2010;	Lewis	2005;	Lim	et	al	2012;	Petri	and	Plummer	2012).	Following	a	brief	overview	of	my	conceptual	framework,	I	track	the	history	of	New	Zealand’s	trade	policy	and	map	out	the	changes	and	continuities	in	policymaking	from	when	New	Zealand	became	a	British	colony	in	1840	to	its	recent	quest	for	the	TPP.	I	suggest	that	the	current	neoliberal	approach	to	trade	is	a	very	recent	development	and	that	since																																																									6	Ministry	for	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade.	30	April	2017,	https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/nz-trade-policy/,	30	April	2017	7	As	the	official	depository,	New	Zealand	is	required	to	safeguard	for	four	years	after	the	last	negotiating	round:	the	negotiating	texts,	the	proposals	of	each	government,	the	accompanying	explanatory	material,	the	emails	related	to	the	substance	of	the	negotiations,	and	any	other	information	that	was	exchanged	among	the	TPP	countries	in	the	context	of	negotiations.		8	As	Kelsey	(1995)	and	Larner	(2003)	both	note,	the	“New	Zealand	Experiment”	was	an	extreme	example	of	the	application	of	a	theoretical	model.	The	package	of	reforms	included	inter	alia	market	liberalisation,	free	trade,	monetarist	policy,	fiscal	restraint	and	the	deregulation	of	the	labour	market.			
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the	late	1990s,	domestic	consensus	has	been	tenuous.	President	Trump’s	decision	and	the	TPP	protests	simply	revealed	this	existing	fragility.	In	the	ethnographic	section	that	follows,	I	give	a	detailed	account	of	the	launch	of	New	Zealand’s	2017	trade	strategy	document	titled	Trade	Agenda:	
2030	at	a	business-government	function.	In	dialogue	with	Wendy	Brown	(2015),	I	use	the	speech	delivered	by	Prime	Minister	Bill	English	as	a	platform	to	then	analyse	the	strategy	document	and	public	diplomacy	speeches	and	blogs	by	corporate	leaders	and	politicians	who	are	members	of	a	pro-free	trade	network.	In	the	conclusion,	I	return	to	the	broader	question	of	why	free	trade	remains	a	compelling	policy	option.		
	
Opening	the	“Black	Box”		In	conventional	accounts	of	trade	policy,	FTAs	are	viewed	mechanistically	as	economic	instruments	authored	by	rational	state	officials	working	in	the	“national	interest”	(e.g.,	Brawley	2005;	Grossman	and	Helpman	2002;	Krasner	1978).	Trade	policy	has	many	technicalities,	and	much	of	the	focus	by	proponents	and	critics	alike	is	on	the	content	of	FTAs	and	the	anticipated	policy	outcomes	(e.g.,	Lim	et	al	2012;	Kelsey	2010).	The	literature	tends	to	concentrate	on	the	economic,	legalistic	or	geopolitical	motivations	and	implications	underlying	FTAs	(e.g.,	Kelsey	2010;	Griffith	et	al	2015).	How	FTAs	are	made	and	by	whom	has	also	been	debated	in	the	literature	but	from	either	a	narrow	statist	viewpoint	(e.g.,	Krasner	1978,	2009;	Krugman	1986;	Krueger	1995;	Skocpol	1985)	or	a	society-centric	viewpoint	(e.g.,	Cox	1996;	Milner	1997;	Putnam	1988;	Schattschneider	1935;	Olson	1995).	In	both	versions,	FTAs	are	rendered	as	economic	objects	set	apart	from	society	and	culture	(Mitchell	1999).		In	contrast,	I	build	on	the	anthropology	of	policy	and	neoliberalism	to	recast	FTAs	as	discursive	projects.	These	techniques	strategically	gather	diverse	discourses	and	align	them	to	create	a	neoliberal	mode	of	governance	(Shore	2011).	Drawing	on	anthropologists	who	focus	on	elites	in	policymaking,	I	try	to	explain	how	and	to	what	effect	elites	produce	policy	rhetoric	(Feldman	2005;	Shore	2011).	However,	although	most	of	the	attention	is	concentrated	on	bureaucrats	or	experts	(Greenhalgh	2008;	Holmes	2009;	Lea	2008;	Schwegler	2008),	mine	focuses	on	business	as	well	as	state	actors	because	FTAs	are	not	the	work	of	state	officials	alone.	At	various	levels,	they	involve	assistance	from	influential	non-state	actors.	The	closest	resemblance	to	my	work	is	Janine	Wedel	(2004,	2009)	who	has	directly	tackled	the	role	of	business	interests	in	policy.	In	Shadow	Elite,	Wedel	(Wedel	2009)	argues	that	“state-private	hybrids”	called	“flex-organisations”	leverage	their	official	connections	to	secure	international	aid	money	and	newly	privatised	state	assets	in	the	former	Soviet	Union.	Wedel’s	“flexi	groups”	are	similar	to	the	business-government	network	that	informs	this	research.	In	framing	FTAs	as	techniques	of	governance,	I	am	informed	by	
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Foucauldian	interpretations	of	neoliberalism	(Brown	2015;	Ong	2006;	Rose	1999).	In	particular,	Wendy	Brown’s	formulation	of	neoliberal	political	rationality	sheds	light	on	my	findings.	In	Undoing	the	Demos:	
Neoliberalism	as	Revolution	(2015),	Brown	draws	on	Foucault	(1978/1991)	and	Caliskan	and	Callon	(2009,	2010)	to	argue	that	more	than	a	suite	of	economic	policies	(see	also	Larner	2003)	the	core	feature	of	neoliberalism	is	in	how	it	“disseminates	the	model	of	the	market	to	all	domains	and	activities”	and,	in	the	process,	reconfigures	the	“knowledge,	form,	content	and	conduct	appropriate	to	these	spheres	and	practices”	(Brown	2015:31).	She	suggests	that	as	neoliberalism	recasts	states	and	persons	as	firms,	their	duties	and	responsibilities	are	thereby	reshuffled,	and	liberal	democracy	is	undermined.	Brown	also	extends	the	concept	of	the	self-managed	subject	(Cruickshank	1993;	Foucault	1978/1991;	Rose	1999)	to	argue	that	individuals	are	not	only	made	responsible	for	their	own	conduct,	to	be	“governed	at	a	distance”,	but	are	also	tied	to	the	fate	the	economy.	People	must	share	the	pain	of	economic	downturns	by	accepting	austerity	measures,	precarious	employment,	stagflation,	housing	shortages	and	volatile	consumer	prices	(Brown	2015:	210).	No	longer	protected	by	the	social	contract,	they	must	instead	tolerate	“insecurity,	deprivation	and	extreme	exposure	to	maintain	competitive	positioning,	growth	or	credit	rating	of	the	nation	as	a	firm”	(213).		I	draw	on	Brown’s	ideas	and	apply	these	to	business	leaders	close	to	the	state	and	policy-making	process.	I	am	interested	in	how	the	state	seeks	to	involve	business	in	the	dissemination	of	neoliberal	political	rationality,	that	is,	how	and	why	it	enjoins	business	to	not	only	legitimise	free	trade	in	their	conduct	of	cross-border	transactions	by	“performing”	the	policy	but	also	help	to	grow	the	“national	economy”	(Appel	2017)	and	advocate	on	its	behalf	for	free	trade.	This	is	more	than	simply	“bridling”	or	absorbing	business	in	order	to	control	and	create	political	acquiescence	(Pero	2011:224).		Rather,	it	also	involves	the	transformation	of	corporate	actors	from	merely	business	owners,	management	or	board	members	to	“risk	takers”,	“entrepreneurs”	and	“unofficial	diplomats”	(see	Berman	and	Johnson	1977).	In	this	regard,	I	follow	Aihwa	Ong’s	(2006,	2007)	work	in	Neoliberalism	as	Exception	(2006)	to	suggest	that	neoliberalism	is	not	a	“structural	condition	that	projects	totalizing	social	change”	(2007:4)	but	that	it	strategically	responds	to	populations	and	space	(see	Hoffman	2010).	In	New	Zealand,	the	state,	with	help	from	chosen	business	elites,	targeted	business	in	order	to	make	it	responsible	for	helping	to	reinvigorate	its	trade	agenda.	Business,	“globally”	connected	exporters	in	particular	(Larner	2007;	Tsing	2011),	were	applauded	and	afforded	agency	by	the	state	as	productive	contributors	to	the	economy.	At	the	same	time,	“passive”	participants	or	“non-agents”	(see	Weiss	205)	of	the	“global	economy”	(Moore	2004;	Tsing	2000,	2011),	such	as	local	businesses,	importers,	workers	and	consumers,	were	excluded	from	the	state’s	concerns.		
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New	Zealand’s	Quest	for	Free	Trade	The	TPP	is	a	free	trade	agreement	between	Australia,	Brunei,	Canada,	Chile,	Japan,	Malaysia,	Mexico,	New	Zealand,	Peru,	Singapore,	the	United	States	(until	23	January	2017)	and	Vietnam.	After	seven	years	of	negotiation,	it	was	finally	signed	on	4	February	2018.	As	a	founding	member	of	the	Agreement,	New	Zealand	has	played	a	critical	role	from	1997,	when	it	was	first	floated	as	an	idea	by	politicians	in	a	Singaporean	hotel	bar,	to	its	current	status	as	the	CPTPP.			In	official	accounts,	economic	benefits	from	improved	access	to	globally	significant	markets	and	global	value	chains	are	presented	as	the	principle	rationale	for	New	Zealand’s	TPP	membership.	This	commentary	is	frequently	accompanied	with	benign	reference	to	New	Zealand	being	a	“trading	nation”	and	a	“small	country,	distant	from	important	markets”.	“Trade”,	we	are	repeatedly	told	by	the	state,	is	“part	of	our	everyday	life”	and	our	“lifeblood”.	Trade	Minster	Todd	McClay’s	speech	at	the	signing	of	the	TPP	exemplifies	this	common	refrain.	He	not	only	reiterated	how	“We	are	a	small	export	nation”	dependent	on	trade	but	also	explained	that	the	TPP	was	about	“doing	what’s	right	for	New	Zealanders”	because	it	will	“bring	prosperity,	jobs	and	higher	incomes	for	your	kids	and	mine”	(McClay	2017).			These	platitudinous	remarks	are	irrefutable:	New	Zealand	is	a	comparatively	small	country,	and	our	economy	does	indeed	rely	on	exports.	But	certain	questions	are	omitted	in	this	narrative:	Has	New	Zealand	always	depended	on	free	trade	to	“prosper”?	How	is	“prosperity”	defined	and	by	whom?	When	did	“trade”	become	synonymous	with	“free	trade”?	In	New	Zealand’s	recent	history,	alternative	versions	of	trade	policy	existed,	but	since	the	mid-1980s,	following	the	introduction	of	neoliberal	reforms,	these	possibilities	have	been	tacitly,	and	until	protests,	successfully,	vanquished	by	the	state	with	the	help	of	business	elites	in	favour	of	a	neoliberal	approach.		A	year	after	becoming	a	British	colony	in	1840,	New	Zealand	applied	its	first	tariffs	(Belich	2001;	Hawke	1985).	From	this	date	until	the	late	1970s,	the	state	used	trade	policy	to	moderate	external	problems	and	demands,	generate	revenue,	bolster	employment	and	grow	the	agricultural	and	manufacturing	industries.	Owing	to	New	Zealand’s	small	population	and	distance	from	trans-Atlantic	trade	routes,	active	state	participation	in	the	economy	was	considered	necessary	to	foster	a	capitalist	society	in	the	likeness	of	“Mother	England”	(Condliffe	1969,	Jesson	1987).	As	Hawke	(1985)	notes,	during	this	period,	there	was	broad	agreement	that	New	Zealand’s	economy	should	be	“determined	less	by	events	overseas	and	more	by	the	choice	of	local	people”	(163).		In	the	late	1970s,	a	series	of	events	adversely	effected	New	Zealand’s	economy.	It	was	at	this	point	that	the	approach	to	trade	began	to	shift	(Nixon	and	Yeabsley	2002).		In	1973,	Britain	joined	the	European	
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Economic	Community	(EEC).	With	this	move,	New	Zealand	lost	its	preferential	market	access.	This	setback	coincided	with	the	1973	oil	crisis	and	resulted	in	the	election	of	a	National	government	(1975-1984)	that	borrowed	heavily	to	pay	for	the	construction	of	large	energy	projects.	Indebted	and	struggling	to	find	new	markets,	the	New	Zealand	economy	entered	its	first	recession	(1976-78,	1982-83).	In	response,	state	officials	from	the	most	influential	government	agencies,	the	Reserve	Bank,	Treasury,	the	Prime	Minister’s	Department,	and	the	Ministry	of	External	Relations	(MERT),	along	with	the	peak	farmer	organisation	Federated	Farmers,	began	to	agitate	for	a	change	to	New	Zealand’s	approach	to	trade.	They	argued	that	the	system	of	subsidies,	tariffs,	import	controls	and	licencing	were	a	drag	on	the	economy	and	impaired	New	Zealand’s	negotiations	at	the	General	Agreement	for	Tariffs	and	Trade	(GATT).	New	Zealand,	they	insisted,	couldn’t	expect	the	Europeans	to	open	their	markets	to	its	products	while	it	maintained	its	“fortress”	of	protections.	However,	proponents	were	also	acutely	aware	of	the	difficulties	in	creating	domestic	support	for	policy	change.	Following	the	end	of	the	Tokyo	Round	of	GATT	negotiations	in	1979,	in	which	agriculture	was	carved	out	from	tariff	reductions,	Australia	approached	New	Zealand	and	proposed	the	formation	of	an	updated	trade	treaty.	This	provided	the	necessary	external	pressure	and	pretext	for	the	state	to	reorganise	trade	policy.	The	vision	was	a	trade	approach	based	on	neo-classical	economics	with	minimal	state	intervention	(Kelsey	1995).		In	1983,	New	Zealand	signed	its	first	comprehensive	FTA,	the	Closer	Economic	Partnership	agreement	with	Australia	(CER).	This	agreement	was	a	turning	point	for	New	Zealand	trade	policy	and	laid	the	ground	for	further,	more	widespread	policy	reforms.	Thus,	in	1985,	a	year	after	the	election	of	a	new	Labour	government	(1984-1990),	all	tariffs	were	unilaterally	cut	and	subsidies	to	farmers	were	completely	removed.	Tariff	rates	above	25	percent	were	dropped	to	5	percent	in	1986,	and	in	1988,	a	new	State	Sector	Act	delinked	domestic	policy	from	trade	policy.	As	a	result,	trade	policy	that	had	previously	been	managed	by	the	Department	of	Trade	and	Industry	(DTI)	was	transferred	to	the	newly	formed,	“outward”	facing	Ministry	for	External	Relations	and	Trade	(MERT).	Woodfield	(2009)	notes	of	this	change,	“…	the	decision	signalled	the	government’s	view	of	New	Zealand’s	international	trade	as	primarily	an	aspect	of	foreign	policy	rather	than	primarily	the	international	extension	of	New	Zealand’s	domestic	economic	policy,	which	had	been	the	approach	over	the	preceding	century”	(162).		Until	the	late	1990s,	the	public	appeared	to	accept	the	state’s	new	policy	approach.	However,	in	1999,	disinterest	gave	way	to	dissent	after	the	election	of	a	left-leaning	government	and	anti-globalisation	protests	in	New	Zealand	at	the	Asia	Pacific	Economic	Cooperation	(APEC)	leaders’	summit	and	in	Seattle	at	the	World	Trade	Organisation	(WTO)	ministerial	meeting.	In	parliament,	the	long-serving	National	Party	was	defeated	by	a	
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centre-left	Labour	Government	(1999-2008).	It	formed	a	majority	with	coalition	partners	the	democratic	socialist	Alliance	party,	which	was	aligned	with	the	anti-globalisation	movement	and	strongly	objected	to	continuing	FTA	negotiations	with	Singapore.	With	the	shift	from	a	centre-right	to	the	left	and	debate	about	the	Singapore	FTA,	concerns	were	raised	by	free	trade	proponents	that	the	state’s	trade	approach	was	at	risk.	This	provoked	a	loose	network	of	state	and	corporate	elites	to	form	new	pro-free	trade,	business-led	groups:	the	APEC	Business	Group,	the	NZ-US	Council	and	the	Trade	Liberalisation	Network.	In	2001,	these	groups	coordinated	the	first	pro-free	trade	conference	called	the	“Coalitions	of	Interest”	in	Auckland.	More	than140	business	leaders,	journalists,	diplomats,	officials	and	politicians,	including	Prime	Minister	Helen	Clark,	attended.		Drawing	on	the	support	of	these	new	business	groups,	throughout	the	2000s,	the	state	managed	to	rebuild	public	support	and	marginalise	opposition.	After	the	Singapore	FTA	was	signed	in	2001,	successive	New	Zealand	Labour-led	and	National-led	governments	signed	FTAs	with	the	Association	of	South	East	Asian	countries	(ASEAN)	(2004),	Thailand	(2005),	Brunei	(2005),	Chile	(2005),	China	(2008),	Malaysia	(2009),	Hong	Kong	(2011),	Taiwan	(2013)	and	South	Korea	(2015).	In	2009,	the	US	officially	joined	the	TPP	negotiations.	The	government	then	stepped	up	its	public	diplomacy	drive	in	order	to	attenuate	anti-American	sentiment,	which	had	surfaced	in	New	Zealand,	and	to	convince	the	US	that	the	TPP	was	strategically	significant	enough	for	it	to	ignore	its	own	opposition	voices.		Towards	this	end,	the	government	worked	closely	with	the	business-government	organisations	to	circulate	messages	about	the	economic	benefits	of	the	TPP	and	to	strengthen	relations	with	other	TPP	states,	particularly	the	US	but	also	Japan.	As	an	example,	between	2006	and	2015,	the	business	organisation	called	the	NZ-US	Council	held	a	series	of	closed	meetings	called	the	NZ-US	Partnership	Forum.	These	meetings,	two	of	which	I	attended	as	a	researcher	(2009,	2011)	in	Washington	DC	and	Auckland,	were	designed	to	create	and	maintain	high-level	links	between	New	Zealand	and	US	senior	administration,	congressional,	defence	and	business	leaders.			Despite	the	government’s	sustained	efforts	to	persuade	the	public	about	the	merits	of	the	TPP,	protests	against	it	grew	more	vocal	and	widespread	as	negotiations	progressed.	This	opposition	focused	on	the	negative	outcomes	from	the	negotiation	text’s	30	chapters	and	on	whose	interests	the	TPP	served	(Kelsey	2010).	The	issues	varied	from	distress	about	job	loss	and	increased	income	inequality	through	to	the	affordability	of	medicines;	foreign	ownership	and	investment	rights;	weak	protections	for	human	rights,	public	health,	labour	and	the	environment;	financial	deregulation;	unsafe	food	and	loss	of	sovereignty.		In	New	Zealand,	frequent	protests	were	organised	by	activist	groups	such	as	It’s	Our	Future	and	TPP	Watch.	These	groups	were	part	of	an	activist	
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network	that	spanned	the	TPP	countries	and	encompassed	diverse	interests	from	consumer	protection	to	human	rights,	environment,	academics,	unions	and	civil	rights	organisations.	Protesters	focused	on	their	specific	sector	issues	and/or	argued	for	greater	transparency	and	more	“meaningful”	stakeholder	engagement	with	governments.		In	the	United	States,	the	Washington-based	group	Public	Citizen	was	particularly	active,	leading	to	successful	awareness-raising	campaigns	that	helped	to	elevate	the	TPP	into	a	US	election	issue.	First,	candidate	Bernie	Sanders	denounced	the	deal,	calling	for	progressive	alternatives,	and	then	followed	Hillary	Clinton	and	Donald	Trump,	who	both	pledged	to	scrap	the	TPP	to	protect	American	workers.	This	culminated	into	the	momentous	event	on	23	January	2017.	In	front	of	a	line	of	cameras,	newly	elected	President	Trump	signed	the	Executive	Order	as	promised	in	his	“Contract	to	the	People”9	and	withdrew	the	United	States	from	the	deal.		
	
Rescuing	the	TPP		 	Two	months	after	Trump	pulled	the	US	out	of	the	TPP,	in	April	2017,	New	Zealand	released	its	new	trade	strategy:	Trade	Agenda	2030:	Securing	Our	
Place	in	the	World.	This	was	the	first	strategic	document	the	government	had	produced	since	1993.	I	was	keen	to	read	what	changes	they	were	intending	to	make	as	a	result	of	Trump’s	election,	the	Brexit	vote	and	the	general	misgivings	about	free	trade.	They	had	chosen	to	launch	the	strategy	at	a	breakfast	organised	by	the	New	Zealand	International	Business	Forum	(NZIBF)	and	the	Auckland	Chamber	of	Commerce.		On	the	morning	of	the	launch,	as	I	entered	the	room,	a	foreign	affairs	official	handed	me	the	strategy	document,	Trade	Agenda	2030.	Its	cover	pictured	the	globe	with	images	depicting	a	geothermal	plant,	a	laboratory,	a	sheep	farm,	a	winery,	forestry	and	a	fishing	vessel	surrounding	New	Zealand.	These	scenes	portrayed	New	Zealand	as	innovative	and	agricultural.	In	the	crowded	room	mingled	the	Prime	Minister,	the	Head	of	Foreign	Affairs,	the	Ministers	of	Trade	and	Foreign	Affairs	(MFAT),	chief	trade	negotiators,	high-level	officials	from	the	Ministry,	business	leaders	and	a	few	pro-free	trade	business	journalists.	I	noted	the	high	number	of	young	foreign	affairs	officials,	who	sat	taking	notes	diligently	throughout	the	proceedings.	I	took	my	seat	at	the	back	of	the	room	as	the	Prime	Minister	Bill	English	made	his	way	to	the	podium.		In	his	speech,	English	introduced	the	government’s	new	trade	strategy	in	the	context	of	a	threat,	a	looming	crisis	(Roitman	2013)	that	Trump	had	come	to	signify.	Both	during	and	after	the	speech,	the	business																																																									9	D.	Trump	“Trump’s	Contract	to	the	American	Voter”,	16	November	2016	https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/_landings/contract/O-TRU-102316-Contractv02.pdf		
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and	government	audience	appeared	unmoved	but	seemingly	in	agreement	with	English’s	logic:	in	the	face	of	rising	protectionism,	the	state	must	expand	not	abate	the	network	of	FTAs	and	press	on	with	the	TPP	without	the	participation	of	the	US.	I	present	excerpts	from	his	2017	speech	below	to	highlight	the	rhetorical	moves	as	it	weaves	together	cultural,	liberal	and	business	references	in	order	to	reaffirm	the	state’s	neoliberal	trade	approach,		Leaders,	entrepreneurs	and	risk	takers.	I	see	people	who	are	backing	themselves	and	their	businesses	on	the	world	stage	and	succeeding.	New	Zealanders	who	are	taking	other	Kiwis	with	them	and	providing	jobs	and	incomes	to	Kiwi	families.	New	Zealanders	who	are	creating	international	connections,	growing	our	global	reputation	and	adding	value	to	our	country.	We	all	recognise	you	and	your	success.	In	his	opening	salutation,	English	addressed	the	audience	as	particular	types	of	economic	actors,	not	as	producers,	owners,	management	or	exporters	per	se	but	as	“Leaders,	entrepreneurs	and	risk	takers”,	framing	them	in	a	financialised	idiom.	As	noted	by	Brown	(2015),	the	distinctiveness	of	neoliberal	political	rationality	is	in	how	it	“economises”	non-economic	spheres,	subjects	and	states.	She	adds	that	there	has	been	a	recent	shift	from	framing	human	beings	as	economic	and	political	actors	to	“financialised	human	capitals”	(33).	This	feature	of	contemporary	neoliberalism	is	evident	in	English’s	representations	of	business	as	“risk	takers”	and	can	also	be	seen	in	how	he	applauded	business	for	“adding	value	to	the	country”.	English	then	continued	to	celebrate	the	audience	for	their	self-reliance	(“backing	themselves”),	selflessness	and	loyalty	in	helping	to	grow	the	“national	economy”	(Appel	2017)	and	“providing	jobs”	for	“Kiwi	families”.	In	his	remark,	we	can	see	the	meshing	of	financial,	entrepreneurial	references	with	the	colonial	myth	of	the	rugged,	masculine,	European	(Bell	1996).	Following	this	praise,	English’s	speech	then	descended	quickly	into	depicting	a	bleak	future:		The	biggest	threat	to	our	economic	success	at	the	moment	is	disruption	of	international	trade.	New	barriers	and	less	integration	would	do	exactly	the	opposite	of	what	their	champions	claim.	They	would	mean	consumers	pay	more,	have	less	choice,	and	the	world	would	be	less	efficient.	There	would	be	fewer	jobs,	incomes	would	grow	more	slowly,	and	we	would	make	slower	progress	on	challenges	we	face	as	an	international	community.	That	means	less	confidence	and	greater	instability.	It	is	a	depressingly	backward	scenario,	and	there	would	be	no	winners.			In	his	last	sentence,	English	comments	that	“there	would	be	no	winners”	without	free	trade.	Free	trade,	he	argues,	will	help	us	to	overcome	the	“challenges	we	face	as	an	international	community”.	What	we	can	infer	from	this	is	that	“healthy”	competition,	abetted	by	FTAs,	will	
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help	solve	a	myriad	of	social,	political	and	environmental	problems.	This	statement	normalises	competition	as	form	of	relating	between	“winners”	and	“losers”	(see	Brown	2015),	but	it	also	implies	that	in	order	to	address	poverty,	inequality,	climate	change,	terrorism	and	other	“challenges”,	the	state’s	responsibility	is	to	negotiate	FTAs	and	implement	policies	that	will	aid,	not	hinder,	comparative	advantage.	Finally,	after	crafting	this	“depressingly	backward”	scenario,	English	presents	the	path	forward:	to	“remain	ambitious”	and	“continue	to	make	the	case	for	free	trade”:		Free	trade	has	helped	spur	the	strong	growth	we	have	seen	in	our	region,	made	it	more	stable	and	lifted	millions	of	people	out	of	poverty.	This	is	part	of	the	reason	we	were	disappointed	with	decision	of	the	US	to	withdraw	from	the	TPP.		The	TPP	would	have	improved	regional	trade	and	it	would	have	ensured	the	US	maintained	its	influence	and	leadership	in	the	Asia	Pacific.	Instead	it	left	a	vacuum	for	others	to	fill.	But	make	no	mistake	while	the	US	withdrawal	is	a	set-back,	it	is	not	the	end	of	the	road.	Trade	negotiations	have	never	been	easy.	We	must	remain	ambitious	and	continue	to	make	the	case	for	free	trade	in	a	world	where	opposition	has	become	louder.	So	I	am	pleased	today	to	launch	the	governments’	updated	trade	strategy.	Trade	Agenda	2030	underlines	our	ambition	to	remain	a	champion	of	free	trade.		English	leverages	Trump’s	withdrawal	to	reposition	free	trade	as	history’s	true	moral	purpose	and	asserts	that	any	deviation	from	this	normative	order	of	reason	as	erroneous	and	“backward”	(see	Roitman	2013).	Rather	than	interpret	the	widespread	protests	both	in	New	Zealand	and	other	TPP	countries	as	an	occasion	to	question	its	stance	and	rethink	its	policy	direction,	English	instead	frames	it	as	a	crisis,	a	sign	of	a	deeper	disturbance	that	leaves	no	choice	but	for	the	state	to	harden	its	position.	He	attempts	to	incite	fear	by	adding	that	with	US	leadership	now	weakened	in	the	region,	“others”	will	take	its	place.	Although	not	explicit,	“others”	represents	China.	During	the	TPP	negotiations,	China	was	frequently	cast	as	an	existential	threat	to	Western	liberal	democracy,	particularly	by	the	United	States.10		In	his	closing	statement,	after	expanding	on	the	budget	and	content	of	the	strategy,	including	its	intentions	and	aims	to	“lead	on	trade,	just	like	we	did	instigating	the	TPP”,	English	spoke	with	nationalistic	pride,	reaffirming	the	state’s	invigorated	plan	to	accelerate	its	neoliberal	approach	to	trade.	English	used	the	common	refrain	“level	the	playing	field”	to	make	his	point	and	braided	together	market	values	with	deeply	held	cultural	convictions	about	the	importance	of	egalitarianism	and																																																									10	On	the	White	House	webpage	during	the	Obama	administration,	for	example,	a	list	appeared	of	consequences	if	the	TPP	failed	and	China	wrote	the	rules	of	international	trade	in	lieu	of	the	US.	These	included	the	erosion	of	democratic	values,	workers’	rights,	human	rights,	civil	liberties	and	environmental	protections.	
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fairness:		Ladies	and	gentlemen,	the	evidence	in	favour	of	free	trade	is	irrefutable.	It	creates	jobs,	boosts	incomes	and	prosperity,	and	it	puts	us	on	the	world	stage.	As	a	government,	we	are	working	hard	to	help	create	a	level	playing	field	for	our	exporters.	And	we	are	incredibly	proud	seeing	New	Zealanders	succeed.	There	is	so	much	to	gain	from	advances	in	free	trade.	I	am	committed	to	seeing	those	gains,	and	on	behalf	of	all	New	Zealanders	we	will	not	stop	working	to	achieve	them.	Thank	you.		
	
Defending	the	State		As	the	government’s	key	public	diplomacy	document	detailing	its	new	strategy,	Trade	Agenda	2030	picks	up	on	themes	in	English’s	speech.	In	the	document,	not	only	is	the	sense	of	a	crisis	purposefully	exaggerated	(Roitman	2013),	but	free	trade	is	cast	as	the	solution	to	the	concerns	raised	by	protestors	and	critics.	We	also	see	the	state	classify	and	treat	business	people,	considered	to	be	active	participants	in	the	global	economy,	differently	from	other	citizens.	Whereas	the	state	is	in	a	partnership	with	business,	with	other	“New	Zealanders”,	the	goal	is	to	educate	in	order	to	“build	confidence	and	trust	in	the	trade	and	openness	agenda”	to	therefore	“dispel	misperceptions	about	issues	such	as	sovereignty	or	government’s	right	to	regulate	for	legitimate	public	policy	purposes”	(2017:10).	Critics’	concerns,	Trade	Agenda	2030	suggests,	are	misinformed:	globalisation,	which	is	distinguishable	from	free	trade	and	is	defined	abstractly	as	“automation”,	“the	changing	nature	of	work”,	and	“improvements	to	transport	and	technology”,	is	the	real	culprit.	The	“TPP	and	TTIP”11,	we	are	told,	were	simply	“lightning	rods	for	those	concerns”.	FTAs	are	neither	the	root	cause	nor	contributing	factor;	in	fact,	FTAs	control	the	runaway	effects	of	globalisation.		To	correct	critics’	ignorance,	the	document	outlines	how	the	state	intends	to	highlight	the	positive	work	of	FTAs.	This	involves	explaining	how	free	trade	can	address	the	“most	pressing	global	problems	of	our	times”.	FTAs	not	only	“lift	millions	out	of	poverty”,	as	English	iterated	in	his	opening	speech,	but	in	Trade	Agenda	2030,	we	are	told	they	can	help	protect	the	environment	as	well	as	labour	and	“…	Put	simply,	success	at	the	trade	negotiating	table	can	deliver	enhanced	agricultural	food	security,	improve	livelihoods	and	developments,	as	well	as	contribute	to	preservation	of	global	fish	stocks”	(5).This	statement	is	more	than	a	co-optation	of	protesters’	concerns	about	the	detrimental	effects	of	free	trade;	it	subordinates	these	issues	to	the	imperatives	of	the	economy.	In	this	move,	regional	economic	growth	enabled	through	FTAs	has	been																																																									11	TTIP	is	the	“Transatlantic	Trade	and	Investment	Partnership”,	an	FTA	between	the	US	and	Europe.	
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redefined	as	the	means	through	which	global	social	and	environmental	concerns	can	now	be	met.	This	undermines	the	need	for	specific	domestic	policies	and	international	treaties	to	address	these	problems	along	with	non-trade	related	governance	organisations.		In	Trade	Agenda	2030,	with	business,	the	state	is	straightforward	in	its	demands.	Identified	and	applauded	as	active	not	passive	contributors	to	the	economy,	business	leaders	are	expected	to	“translate	market	access”	into	“competitive	success”	and	“grow	their	capacity	to	engage	with	government”	to	“succeed	overseas”	(46).	In	return	for	developing	the	national	economy,	the	state’s	commitment	to	business	is	to	help	“facilitate”	this	process	by	signing	more	FTAs.	As	English	stated	in	his	introduction	to	the	new	strategic	document,	“If	we	open	doors,	New	Zealanders	will	walk	through	them,	creating	opportunities	for	themselves	and	others.”	But	business	leaders	are	not	only	expected	to	succeed	and	provide	for	the	nation.	The	state	also	asks	them	to	work	harder	to	defend	its	policy	in	the	face	of	opposition	from	other	New	Zealanders.	In	November	2016,	on	the	eve	of	Trump’s	election	and	following	Brexit,	Trade	Minister	Todd	McClay	spoke	to	the	pro-free	trade	think	tank	Policy	Exchange	in	London.	In	his	speech	titled	“The	Case	for	Global	Trade	in	An	Era	of	Populist	Protectionism”,	McClay	starts	by	praising	his	government’s	handling	of	TPP	protestors,	whom	he	dismisses	as	being	unenlightened	“populists”	(see	Gusterson	2017).	He	ends	by	calling	on	business	to	promote	free	trade:			At	the	signing	of	the	TPP,	10,000	people	marched	in	protest.	Not	all	of	them	knew	why	they	were	there.	That	doesn’t	sound	like	many,	but	proportionally	that’s	1.6	million	in	the	EU.	At	the	final	reading	of	the	TPP,	only	20	protestors	took	part.	In	part	that	is	because	we	engaged	more	widely.	We	talked,	explained,	fronted	up.	But	governments	can’t	do	this	alone.	We	need	to	find	ways	to	engage	with	business	and	industry	better,	we	need	them	to	advocate	for	the	benefit	of	trade.	We	need	workers	whose	livelihoods	depend	on	access	to	foreign	markets	to	see	opportunities	not	threats.	In	a	world	increasingly	ruled	by	sound	bites,	telling	these	positive	stories	should	be	a	priority	we	are	unashamed	to	deliver.	Business	elites	close	to	the	state	have	also	turned	to	business	in	the	effort	to	restore	public	support	for	free	trade.	Take,	for	example,	Phil	O’Reilly’s	post12	on	the	New	Zealand	International	Business	Forum’s	(NZIBF)	public	diplomacy	website	“Trade	Works”.13	In	his	remarks,	O’Reilly,	New	Zealand’s	representative	to	the	APEC	Business’s	Advisory	Committee	(ABAC),	draws	on	a	crisis	trope	in	the	same	manner	as	English																																																									12	P.	O’Reilly.	“Talking	Trade	in	Canada”.	Trade	Works	Blog	(blog),	4	August	2017	http://www.tradeworks.org.nz/?p=2702	13	See	http://www.tradeworks.org.nz/,	accessed	31	August	2017	
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and	Trade	Agenda	2030	in	order	to	encourage	business	to	defend	free	trade.	Adopting	a	political-military	register,	he	urges	business	to	wake	up	from	complacency	and	become	more	proactive	for	the	sake	of	“our	communities”:					These	are	testing	times	for	trade	liberalisation.	There	has	been	a	lot	of	talk	over	the	last	year	about	the	rise	of	protectionism	and	the	risks	of	an	all-out	trade	war.			Whether	this	actually	manifests	in	significant	concrete	action	remains	to	be	seen	–	but	what	should	worry	us	is	how	hard	it	is	to	shift	the	dial	on	the	public	debate	on	trade.	We	cannot	afford	to	be	disengaged	from	this:	our	communities	(and	the	most	vulnerable	groups	in	them)	will	be	the	losers	if	we	see	the	erosion	of	a	fifty-year	consensus	towards	more	open	markets	and	freeing	up	flows	of	trade,	investment	and	people.	O’Reilly	is	not	the	only	member	of	the	business	elite	to	mimic	the	state	and	responsibilise	business.	Stephanie	Honey,	Associate	Director	of	the	New	Zealand	International	Business	Forum	(NZIBF),	exemplifies	this	narrative.	In	her	blog14	on	Trade	Works	she	attempts	to	provoke	business	into	action	by	calling	on	them	to	rise	up	as	a	team	of	“Globalists”	and	stop	the	deluded	economic	nationalists	from	leading	the	world	into	catastrophe.	Her	message	is	similar	to	English’s	and	draws	on	modernist	notions	to	cast	free	trade	as	progressive	and	other	versions	as	dangerously	antediluvian,		For	Globalists,	this	is	a	dispiriting	time	with	a	swing	towards	economic	nationalism	and	ceding	of	global	economic	leadership	by	the	Trump	Administration.	Political	and	business	leaders	must	continue	to	champion	greater	openness	and	talk	about	the	real	benefits	of	globalisation.	They	[protectionists]	must	recognise	they	cannot	roll	back	the	clock	and	indeed	trying	to	do	so	would	be	catastrophic	for	the	world	economy	and	for	their	own	communities.		
	
Conclusion	In	New	Zealand,	free	trade	is	far	from	dead.	Before	the	demise	of	the	TPP,	the	state	had	entreated	business	to	utilise	trade	agreements	and	selectively	drew	on	the	resources	of	an	elite	business-government	network	to	help	support	this	message.	This	strategy	had	worked	in	favour	of	the	constrained	neoliberal	state	by	helping	to	create	the	appearance	of	a	broad	consensus	within	New	Zealand	and	to	foster	relationships	with	counter-party	elites	in	other	pro-free	trade	countries.	However,	when	confronted	by	overwhelming	opposition	and	the	likely	withdraw	of	the	US,	rather	than	reconsider	its	stance	on	trade,	the	state	deployed	discursive	strategies	and	sought	additional	help	from	business	in	order	to																																																									14	S.	Honey.	“Defending	Globalisation:	We’re	all	in	this	Together”.	Trade	Works	
Blog	(blog),	17	April	2017,	http://www.tradeworks.org.nz/?p=2566	
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defend	and	promote	free	trade	and	the	TPP.	Thus,	Trump’s	decision	was	reframed	as	a	crisis	that	threatened	Western	liberal	democracy	(“our	way	of	life”),	and	free	trade,	primed	as	the	enabler	of	economic	growth,	was	recast	as	the	solution	to,	rather	than	the	cause	of,	public	concerns.	In	its	place	were	positioned	the	impersonal,	unassailable	forces	of	globalisation.	Valued	by	the	state	as	active	participants	in	the	global	economy,	business	leaders	were	doubly	responsibilised:	both	expected	to	succeed	as	patriotic	“risk	takers”	with	minimal	state	assistance	and	called	on	to	halt	the	rise	of	“populist	protectionism”	for	the	sake	of	not	only	the	nation	(“Kiwi	families”)	and	the	“most	vulnerable”	but	also	the	entire	“international	community”.		The	implications	of	this	manoeuvre	are	stark.	With	business	enjoined	to	act	like	a	state	and	the	state	to	behave	like	a	firm,	responsibilities	are	reshuffled	and	the	fate	of	the	national	economy	and	the	people	rests	with	unelected	management	and	boards	whose	primary	commitment	is	to	maximise	profit,	not	public	welfare.	Meanings	are	also	altered	as	non-economic	concepts	such	as	justice	and	fairness	are	drawn	on	to	mobilise	support	in	what	Colin	Crouch	has	described	as	the	weakness	of	neoliberalism:	its	inability	to	become	a	popular	political	force	because	of	its	overly	detailed,	technical	ideas,	which	are	“remote	from	human	experiences”	(see	Crouch	2016:	499).	Free	trade,	when	codified	by	law	as	FTAs,	enshrines	these	types	of	transpositions.	Moreover,	contemporary	versions	of	FTAs,	such	as	the	TPP,	which	explicitly	seek	to	include	sustainability	and	development	chapters,	transform	FTAs	into	legally	sanctioned	CSR	policies	and	standards	writ	large.	This	expansion	raises	a	number	of	issues.	Most	significant	is	the	elevation	of	economic	growth	as	the	singular	critical	path	to	addressing	non-economic	issues	and	the	usurpation	of	state-led	development	by	business	as	the	principal	organising	agent	(Rajak	2011).		Related	to	this	is	the	undermining	of	enforceable	state	policies	and	intergovernmental	treaties	by	weaker,	softer	FTA	rules.	Thus	new	trade	agreements	such	as	the	TPP	provide	business	with	the	credibility	and	moral	legitimacy	of	being	socially	responsible	(see	Foster	2014;	Rajak	2011)	without	the	costs	or	liability	of	implementation.	The	observations	made	in	this	case	study	about	the	transpositioning	of	business	and	government	is	the	result	of	long	term	fieldwork	starting	in	2009.	At	first	glance,	it	would	appear	that	business	agitates	the	state	to	pursue	free	trade	agreements.	However	with	closer	analysis	over	a	long	duration	what	is	revealed	is	the	stronger	hand	of	the	state	to	determine	policy	direction,	shape	rhetoric	and	selectively	decide	who	should	be	chosen	as	‘partners’.	Policy	affects	business,	and	international	trade	agreement	such	as	the	TPP,	can	have	lasting	effects	on	the	ways	of	doing	business.	It	is	therefore	important	for	researchers	to	both	pay	detailed	attention	to	the	making	of	policy	and	question	assumptions	about	the	power	of	business,	but	also	to	consider	the	
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cultural	contexts	in	which	policy	enfolds.	In	the	case	of	the	TPP	in	New	Zealand,	business	may	have	fronted	the	free	trade	discourse	but	working	actively	from	behind	was	the	state.			
References	Appel,	H.	2017.	Toward	an	ethnography	of	the	National	Economy.	Cultural	Anthropology,	32(2):	294-322.	https://doi.org/10.14506/ca32.2.09	Besky,	S.	2016.	The	Darjeeling	distinction:	Labor	and	justice	on	fair-trade	tea	plantations	in	India.	Oakland,	CA:	University	of	California	Press.	 	Bell,	Claudia.	1996.	Inventing	New	Zealand:	Everyday	myths	of	Pakeha	identity.	Wellington:	Penguin	Books.	 	Belich,	J.	2001.	Making	peoples:	A	history	of	the	New	Zealanders,	from	Polynesian	settlement	to	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century.	Honolulu:	University	of	Hawaii	Press.	 	Berman,	M.,	and	J.	Johnson.	1977.	Unofficial	diplomats.	New	York:	Columbia	University	Press.	 	Bourdieu,	P.,	and	T.	Eagleton.	1992.	Doxa	and	common	life.	New	Left	Review,	191(1):111-21.	 	Brawley,	M.	R.	2005.	Power,	money	and	trade:	Decisions	that	shape	global	economic	relations.	Toronto:	Broadview	Press.	 	Brown,	W.	2015.	Undoing	the	demos:	Neoliberalism's	stealth	revolution.	Michigan:	MIT	Press.	 	Çalışkan,	K.,	and	M.	Callon.	2009.	Economization,	part	1:	Shifting	attention	from	the	economy	towards	processes	of	economization.	Economy	and	Society,	38(3):	369-398.	https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140903020580	 	Çalışkan,	K.,	and	M.	Callon.	2010.	Economization,	part	2:	a	research	programme	for	the	study	of	markets.	Economy	and	Society,	39(1):	1-32.	https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140903424519	 	Crouch,	C.,	D.D.	Porta,	D.D.	and	W.	Streeck.	2016.	Democracy	in	neoliberalism?.	Anthropological	Theory,	16(4):	497-512.	https://doi.org/10.1177/1463499616677904	 	Cruikshank,	B.	1993.	Revolutions	within:	Self-government	and	self-esteem.	Economy	and	Society	22(3):	327-44.	https://doi.org/10.1080/03085149300000022	 	
Journal	of	Business	Anthropology,	8(1),	Spring	2019		
	80	
Comaroff,	J.	and	J.	Comaroff.	2009.	Ethnicity,	inc.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press.	https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226114736.001.0001	 	Condliffe,	J.	B.	1969.	The	economic	outlook	of	New	Zealand.	Christchurch:	Whitcombe	and	Tombs.	 	Cox,	R.,	ed.	1996.	Business	and	the	state	in	international	relations.	Oxford:	Westview	Press.	 	Dolan,	C.	and	Rajak,	D.	eds.,	2016.	The	anthropology	of	corporate	social	responsibility.	Oxford:	Berghahn	Books.	 	English,	B.	"PM	Launches	Ambitious	Trade	Agenda".	Speech	given	at	New	Zealand's	updated	trade	strategy	Trade	Agenda	2030,	New	Zealand,	24	March,	2017.	 	Evans,	L.,	and	M.	Richardson.	2002.	Trade	reform	in	New	Zealand:	Unilateralism	at	work.	In	Going	alone:	the	case	for	relaxed	reciprocity	in	freeing	trade.	J.	Bhagwati,	ed.	Pp	167–217.	Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press.	 	Feldman,	G.	2005.	Culture,	state,	and	security	in	Europe:	The	case	of	citizenship	and	integration	policy	in	Estonia.	American	Ethnologist,	32(4):	676-94.	https://doi.org/10.1525/ae.2005.32.4.676	 	Feldman,	G.	2011.	Illuminating	the	apparatus:	Steps	toward	a	nonlocal	ethnography	of	global	governance.	In	Policy	worlds:	anthropology	and	the	analysis	of	contemporary	power.	C.	Shore,	S.	Wright	and	D.	Pero,	eds.	Pp	32-49.	Oxford:	Berghahn	Books.	 	Fisher,	J.	2013.	Fair	or	balanced?:	The	other	side	of	fair	trade	in	a	Nicaraguan	sewing	cooperative.	Anthropological	Quarterly	86(2):	527-557.	https://doi.org/10.1353/anq.2013.0017	 	Foucault,	M.	1978/1991.	Governmentality.	In	The	Foucault	effect:	studies	in	governmentality.	G.	Burchell,	C.	Gordon	and	P.	Miller,	eds.	Pp	87–104.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press.	 	Garsten,	C.,	and	M.	Montoya,	eds.	2008.	Transparency	in	a	new	global	order.	Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar	Publishing.	https://doi.org/10.4337/9781848441354	 	Gledhill,	J.	1995.	Neoliberalism,	transnationalization,	and	rural	poverty:	a	case	study	of	Michoacán,	Mexico.	Boulder,	CO:	Westview	Press.	 	Greenhalgh,	S.	2008.	Just	one	child:	Science	and	policy	in	Deng's	China.	California:	University	of	California	Press.	https://doi.org/10.1525/california/9780520253384.001.0001	 	
             Maher	/	Unfair	Trade:	Protectionism,	Protests	and	the	Pursuit	of	Free	Trade	in	New	Zealand		
	 81	
Grossman,	G.,	and	E.	Helpman.	2002.	Interest	groups	and	trade	policy.	Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press.	 	Griffith,	M.K.,	R.	Steinberg	and	J.	Zysman.	2015.	Great	power	politics	in	a	global	economy:	Origins	and	consequences	of	the	TPP	and	TTIP.	http://www.brie.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Great-Power-Politics-in-a-Global-Economy-Origins-and-Consequences-of-the-TPP-and-TTIP.pdf.		
	
Gusterson,	H.	2017.	From	Brexit	to	Trump:	Anthropology	and	the	rise	of	nationalist	populism.	American	Ethnologist	44(2):	209-214.	https://doi.org/10.1111/amet.12469	 	Gutmann,	M.	C.	1978.	For	whom	the	taco	bells	toll:	Popular	responses	to	NAFTA	south	of	the	border.	Critique	of	Anthropology	18(3):	297-315.	https://doi.org/10.1177/0308275X9801800305	 	Hawke,	G.	1985.	The	making	of	New	Zealand:	An	economic	history.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	 	Hastrup,	K.	2005.	Social	anthropology:	towards	a	pragmatic	enlightenment.	Social	Anthropology	13(2):	133–149.	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0964028205001199	 	Hewamanne,	S.	2008.	Stitching	identities	in	a	free	trade	zone:	Gender	and	politics	in	Sri	Lanka.	Philadelphia,	PA:	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press.	https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812202250	 	Hoffman,	L.	2010.	Patriotic	professionalism	in	urban	China:	Fostering	talent	(Vol.	66).	Philadelphia,	PA:	Temple	University	Press.	 	Holmes,	D.R.,	2009.	Economy	of	words.	Cultural	Anthropology	24(3):	381-419.	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1360.2009.01034.x	 	Keck,	M.E.,	and	K.	Sikkink,	K.	2014.	Activists	beyond	borders:	Advocacy	networks	in	international	politics.	Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press.	 	Kelsey,	J.	1995.	The	New	Zealand	experiment:	a	world	model	for	structural	adjustment?	Auckland:	Auckland	University	Press.	https://doi.org/10.7810/9781869401306	 	Kelsey,	J.	2008.	Serving	whose	interests?	The	political	economy	of	trade	in	services	agreements.	New	York:	Routledge.	https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203933930	 	Kelsey,	J.,	ed.	2010.	No	ordinary	deal:	unmasking	the	Trans-Pacific	Partnership	free	trade	agreement.	Wellington:	Bridget	Williams	Books.	https://doi.org/10.7810/9781877242502	 	Krasner,	S.	1978.	Defending	the	national	interest.	Princeton:	Princeton	 	
Journal	of	Business	Anthropology,	8(1),	Spring	2019		
	82	
University	Press.	Krasner,	S.	2009.	Power,	the	state,	and	sovereignty:	Essays	on	international	relations.	New	York:	Routledge.	https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203882139	 	Krueger,	A.	1995.	American	trade	policy:	a	tragedy	in	the	making.	Washington	DC:	The	AEI	Press.	 	Krugman,	P.	1986.	Strategic	trade	policy	and	the	new	international	economics.	Cambridge:	MIT	Press.	 	Jesson,	B.	1987.	Behind	the	mirror	glass:	the	growth	of	wealth	and	power	in	New	Zealand	in	the	eighties.	Auckland:	Penguin	Press.	 	Larner,	W.	2003.	Neoliberalism:	Policy,	ideology,	governmentality.	Studies	in	Political	Economy	63:	5-25	https://doi.org/10.1080/19187033.2000.11675231	 	Larner,	W.	2007.	Expatriate	experts	and	globalising	governmentalities:	the	New	Zealand	diaspora	strategy.	Transactions	of	the	Institute	of	British	Geographers	32(3):	331-345.	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2007.00261.x	 	Lea,	T.	2008.	Bureaucrats	and	bleeding	hearts:	Indigenous	health	in	Northern	Australia.	UNSW	Press.	 	Lewis,	M.	2005.	The	free	trade	agreement	paradox.	New	Zealand	Universities	Law	Review	21:	554–574.	 	Li,	T.M.,	2007.	The	will	to	improve:	Governmentality,	development,	and	the	practice	of	politics.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press	https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822389781	 	Lim,	C.L.,	D.K.	Elms	and	P.	Low,	eds.	2012.	The	trans-pacific	partnership:	a	quest	for	a	twenty-first	century	trade	agreement.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139236775	 	Lyon,	S.	2010.	Coffee	and	community:	Maya	farmers	and	fair-trade	markets.	Boulder,	CO:	University	Press	of	Colorado.	 	McClay,	T.	"Trans-Pacific	Partnership	(TPP)	Agreement	Ministerial	Statement.	Press	release,	New	Zealand,	17	August,	2017.	 	McClay,	T.	"The	Case	for	Global	Trade	in	an	Era	of	Populist	Protectionism:	Lessons	from	New	Zealand."	Speech	given	at	the	Policy	Exchange,	London,	30	November,	2016.	 	McClay,	T.	"Todd	McClay:	A	Cause	to	Celebrate".	Speech	given	at	the	signing	of	the	TPP,	New	Zealand,	4	February,	2016.	 	
             Maher	/	Unfair	Trade:	Protectionism,	Protests	and	the	Pursuit	of	Free	Trade	in	New	Zealand		
	 83	
Maher,	S.	2016.	Behind	closed	doors:	Secrecy	and	transparency	in	the	Trans-Pacific	Partnership	trade	negotiations.	SITES:	Journal	of	Social	Anthropology	and	Cultural	Studies,	16(2):	187-209	https://doi.org/10.11157/sites-vol13iss2id324	 	Miyazaki,	H.,	and	A.	Riles.	2005.	Failure	as	an	Endpoint.	New	Jersey:	Blackwell	Publishing	Ltd.	 	Moberg,	M.	2016.	Market's	end:	Fair-trade	social	premiums	as	development	in	Dominica.	American	Ethnologist	43(4):	677-690.	https://doi.org/10.1111/amet.12383	 	Milner,	H.	1997.	Interests,	institutions,	and	information:	domestic	politics	and	international	relations.	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade.	1993.	New	Zealand	trade	policy:	Implementation	and	directions,	a	multitrack	approach.	Wellington:	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade.	
	
Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade.	2017.	Trade	agenda	2030:	Securing	our	place	in	the	world.	Wellington:	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade.	 	Mitchell,	T.	1999.	Society,	economy,	and	the	state	effect.	In	State/culture:	state	formation	after	the	cultural	turn.	G.	Steinmetz,	ed.	Pp	76–97.	Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press.	 	Moore,	H.L.	2004.	Global	anxieties:	concept-metaphors	and	pre-theoretical	commitments	in	anthropology.	Anthropological	theory,	4(1):71-88.	https://doi.org/10.1177/1463499604040848	 	Nader,	L.	1972.	Up	the	anthropologist:	Perspectives	gained	from	studying	up.	In	Reinventing	anthropology.	D.	Hymes,	ed.	Pp	284–311.	New	York:	Pantheon	Press.	 	Nixon,	C.G.	and	J.	Yeabsley.	2002.	New	Zealand's	trade	policy	odyssey:	Ottawa,	Via	Marrakech,	and	on.	Wellington:	NZIER.	 	Olson,	M.	1965.	The	logic	of	collective	action.	Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press.	 	Ong,	A.	2006.	Neoliberalism	as	exception:	Mutations	in	citizenship	and	sovereignty.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press.	https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822387879	 	Ong,	A.	2007.	Neoliberalism	as	a	mobile	technology.	Transactions	of	the	Institute	of	British	Geographers	32(1):	3-8.	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2007.00234.x	 	Pearson,	T.W.	2013.	"Life	is	not	for	sale!":	Confronting	free	trade	and	intellectual	property	in	Costa	Rica.	American	Anthropologist	115(1):	58-71.	 	
Journal	of	Business	Anthropology,	8(1),	Spring	2019		
	84	
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1433.2012.01535.x	Petri,	P.,	and	M.	Plummer.	2012.	The	Trans-Pacific	Partnership	and	Asia-Pacific	integration:	a	quantitative	assessment.	Peterson	Institute	for	International	Economics:	Washington	D.C.	 	Putnam,	R.	1988.	Diplomacy	and	domestic	politics:	the	logic	of	two-level	games.	International	Organization	42:	427–460.	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027697	 	Riles,	A.	2004.	Real	time:	Unwinding	technocratic	and	anthropological	knowledge.	American	ethnologist,	31(3):	392-405.	https://doi.org/10.1525/ae.2004.31.3.392	 	Roitman,	J.	2013.	Anti-crisis.	Durham:	Duke	University	Press.	https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822377436	 	Rose,	N.,	1999.	Powers	of	freedom:	Reframing	political	thought.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	university	press.	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511488856	 	Schattschneider,	E.	E.	1935.	Politics,	pressures	and	the	tariff:	a	study	of	free	enterprise	in	Pressure	politics	as	shown	in	the	1929–1930	revision	of	the	tariff.	New	York:	Prentice-Hall.	 	Schwegler,	T.A.	2008.	Take	it	from	the	top	(down)?	Rethinking	neoliberalism	and	political	hierarchy	in	Mexico.	American	Ethnologist	35(4):	682-700.	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1425.2008.00105.x	 	Shore,	C.,	and	S.	Nugent,	eds.	2002.	Elite	cultures:	anthropological	perspectives.	London:	Routledge.	 	Shore,	C.,	and	S.	Wright.	1997.	Anthropology	of	policy:	Critical	perspectives	on	governance	and	power.	London:	Routledge.	 	Shore,	C.,	S.	Wright	and	D.	Però,	eds.	2011.	Policy	worlds:	Anthropology	and	the	analysis	of	contemporary	power	(Vol.	14).	Oxford:	Berghahn	Books.	 	Skocpol,	T.	1985.	Bringing	the	state	back	in:	Strategies	of	analysis	in	current	research.	In	Bringing	the	state	back	in.	P.	Evans,	D.	Rueschemeyer	and	T.	Skocpol,	eds.	Pp	3-43.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511628283.002	 	Slocum,	K.	2006.	Free	trade	and	freedom:	Neoliberalism,	place,	and	nation	in	the	Caribbean.	Ann	Arbor,	MI:	University	of	Michigan	Press.	https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.167836	 	Smith,	J.	and	Helfgott,	F.,	2010.	Flexibility	or	exploitation?	Corporate	social	responsibility	and	the	perils	of	universalization.	Anthropology	Today,	 	
             Maher	/	Unfair	Trade:	Protectionism,	Protests	and	the	Pursuit	of	Free	Trade	in	New	Zealand		
	 85	
26(3)":	20-23.	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8322.2010.00737.x	State	Sector	Act	1988	(New	Zealand).	 	Tsing,	A.	2011.	Friction:	An	ethnography	of	global	connection.	Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press.	 	Tsing,	A.	2000.	The	global	situation.	Cultural	anthropology,	15(3):	327-360.	https://doi.org/10.1525/can.2000.15.3.327	 	Wedel,	J.	2004.	Blurring	the	state-private	divide:	flex	organisations	and	the	decline	of	accountability.	In	Globalization,	poverty	and	conflict:	a	critical	development	reader.	M.	Spoor,	ed.	Pp	217–235.	Boston:	Kluwer	Academic	Publishers.	 	Wedel,	J.	2009.	Shadow	elite:	how	the	world's	new	power	brokers	undermine	democracy,	government	and	the	free	market.	New	York:	Basic	Books.	 	Welker,	M.A.,	2009.	"Corporate	security	begins	in	the	community":	Mining,	the	corporate	social	responsibility	industry,	and	environmental	advocacy	in	Indonesia.	Cultural	Anthropology,	24(1):	142-179.	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1360.2009.00029.x	 	Woodfield,	T.	2009.	Trade	negotiations:	punching	above	our	weight.	In	Agents	abroad:	the	story	of	the	New	Zealand	Trade	Commissioner	Service.	New	Zealand	Trade	and	Enterprise.	Pp	137–164.	Auckland:	Penguin.	 	Wright,	S.,	and	S.	Reinhold.	2011.	"Studying	through":	a	strategy	for	studying	political	transformation.	Or	sex,	lies	and	British	politics.	In	Policy	worlds:	anthropology	and	the	analysis	of	contemporary	power.	C.	Shore,	S.	Wright	and	D.	Pero,	eds.	Pp	86-104.	Oxford:	Berghahn	Books.	 					
Sasha	Maher,	Ph.D.	is	a	Research	Fellow	at	the	Anthropology	Department,	and	Mira	Szaszy	Centre	for	Maori	and	Pacific	Development	at	the	University	of	Auckland.	Sasha’s	research	addresses	trade	politics,	small	states,	business-government	relations,	and	corporate	social	responsibility.	Her	email	address	is	s.maher@auckland.ac.nz.		
